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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between stock market reaction to hori-
zontal merger announcements and technical efficiency levels of the participating
firms. The analysis is based on data pertaining to eighty mergers between firms
in the U.S. manufacturing industry during the 1990s. We employ Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) to measure technical efficiency, which capture the firms.
competence to produce the maximum output given certain productive resources.
Abnormal returns related to the merger announcements provide the investor.s re-
evaluation on the future performance of the participating firms. In order to avoid
the problem of nonnormality, heteroskedasticity in the regression analysis, boot-
strap method is employed for estimations and inferences. We found that there is
a significant relationship between technical efficiency and market response. The
market apparently welcomes the merger as an arrangement to improve resource
utilizations.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G14, C61, C15
2TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND STOCK MARKET REACTION
TO HORIZONTAL MERGERS
1. Introduction
A widely used index of the stock market reaction to a merger announcement is
the rate of abnormal returns earned by the firms involved in the merger. Abnormal return
is measured by the difference between realized return around the announcement and the
normal return. This approach is often described as event study. Over the past two decades
there have been numerous applications of the event study methodology in studying
mergers and acquisitions1.  Most studies focus on the overall magnitude of stock price
reaction around the time of the announcement. But the source of any abnormal return is
seldom explored empirically. Various theoretical studies have suggested expected
elimination of the agency cost (Jensen, 1986), adoption of more efficient production or
organizational technology, and realization of scale economies as possible reasons for
abnormal returns associated with merger announcements. Others have attempted to
explain the abnormal return differentials by method of payment (Travlos, 1987; Bower et
al., 2000), firm size, and level of industry concentration (Eckbo, 1985). Not much has
been done, however, to link the fundamental measure of the firm’s performance and the
market evaluation of the firm around the date of merger announcement. This is especially
true for the manufacturing industry, although some applications can be found in service
industries (Alam and Sickles, 1998; Huang, 1999; Kohers et al., 2000). The objective of
                                                
1  For a detailed review, refer to Jensen and Ruback (1983), Halpern (1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), and
Andrade et al.(2001).
3this paper is to investigate the relationship between stock market response to the merger
announcement and the participating firms’ technical efficiency. Technical efficiency
measures a firm’s managerial competence at combining inputs and outputs in its
production process while the stock market returns reflect the investors’ market evaluation
based on the firm’s fundamental value. If capital market is efficient, the stock returns can
capture the expected economic gain from the proposed merger. This study is designed to
examine if and how the technical efficiencies of the participating firms affect the
market’s assessment of merger potentials focusing on the empirical evidence from the
U.S. manufacturing industry in the 1990s.
For this, we first compute the abnormal return of each firm in the sample using
the traditional event study analysis. Simultaneously, we employ Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) to calculate the technical efficiency of each firm one year before the
mergers announcement2.  In the next stage, the event-related abnormal returns are
regressed on several explanatory variables, which include technical efficiencies and other
control variables using data from firms involved in mergers over the study period.
Inferences about the relationship between abnormal returns and firm specific
characteristics are drawn from the results of these regressions. One problem is that
statistical tests strongly reject the assumptions of homoscedasticty and normality of the
regression disturbances. This, of course, invalidates the usual tests of significance of the
regression coefficients. To overcome this problem, we employ the bootstrap
                                                                                                                                                
2 DEA has also been used to measure managerial ability in bank evaluations known as CAMEL (Barr et al.,
1993). The evaluation factors are: capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings ability and
liquidity.
4methodology. The results show that abnormal returns are strongly related with efficiency
levels of both the bidding firms and the targets.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we perform a
distribution-free test of significance of the regression of abnormal returns on technical
efficiency of the firms involved. Second, we add to the limited number of studies that
attempt to explore the relation between the technical efficiency and the market valuation
of a firm. Moreover, it is the first application of DEA coupled with event study to
manufacturing industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the relevant
empirical literature on the event studies and the cross-sectional regressions. Section three
outlines the methodologies for event study, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and
bootstrapping in regression analysis. Section four describes the datasets and the empirical
results and section five concludes.
2. Literature Review
In the financial economics literature, it is common to employ an event study
approach to analyze the impact of a merger “event” upon the stock price performance of
both the targets and acquirers. This strand of research is based on the assumption that the
stock market is efficient3. Market efficiency means that actual market prices incorporate
all available information and that the actual market return of an asset is the intrinsic
economic return of the firm (Fama, 1970 and 1991). Therefore, any deviation from the
                                                
3  There are three forms of market efficiency in the financial literature: (1) weak form of the market
efficiency, that is, the capital market can reflect all the past information; (2) semi-strong form of the market
efficiency, that is, the stock prices can reflect public information announcement; (3) strong form of the
5normal or expected return, known as the abnormal return, reflects the effect of the merger
event upon the participating firms, and it can be regarded as the change in the valuation
of the firm resulting from the merger. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed a number of
studies of the stock prices of the participating firms for both successful and unsuccessful
mergers in the 1980s. The evidence indicated that target firms in successful takeovers
experienced statistically significant abnormal stock price increases while bidding firms
realized small but sometime insignificantly negative changes4. The overall effect for
acquiring firms is not clear. There were insignificant stock price changes for the
unsuccessful takeovers for the target firms. These empirical studies do not restrict
themselves to horizontal mergers between firms within the same industry. They generally
examine mergers by analyzing the data from a several-week time “window” around a
merger announcement. Scherer (1988) argued that when the time frame was extended to
one to three years after the merger event, acquiring firms are found to experience
negative abnormal returns. However, a long-run study often confounds the effects of
various events that occur over the longer time horizon with the effect of the merger event
itself. As a result, the variance is usually high and the negative abnormal returns often
turn out to be insignificant.
Although the overall market reaction to merger announcements are generally
recognized, proper understanding of the association between the magnitude of the
abnormal return to each merger event and specific sources is still limited. Various
theoretical sources of gains to takeovers have been suggested. They include: (1) synergies
such as potential reductions in production or distribution costs; (2) financial benefits,
                                                                                                                                                
market efficiency, that is, the stock price can reflect the private information. The semi-strong form of the
market efficiency is employed in the event study literature.
6including the use of tax shields, avoidance of bankruptcy costs and other types of tax
advantages; (3) elimination of managerial inefficiency; (4) anticompetitive motivations;
and (5) wealth redistribution. Auerbach and Reishus (1987) studied 318 mergers and
acquisitions during 1968-83 to estimate tax benefits and  found that tax benefits play a
minor role in explaining merger and takeover activities. Jarrell et al. (1988) reviewed
most of the redistribution theories about the source of merger gains. They found that none
of those hypotheses was supported by the empirical evidence and concluded that the
merger gains primarily reflected economically beneficial reshufflings of productive assets
and managements. Eckbo (1985) used capital market data to test the market concentration
theory, and found that industry wealth effect is not correlated with the change in
concentration nor the pre-merger concentration level.
Travlos (1987) provides a direct link between the different stock returns towards
merger proposal announcement and the methods of payment of bidding firms. He found
that acquirers with pure stock payment experienced significant losses while others on
cash payment earned the normal rate of return. Bower et al. (2000) investigated the
bidders’ and targets’ perspectives towards the financial slack and mode of payments in
corporate acquisitions. They found that bidders with financial slacks but using common
stock experienced lower abnormal returns at the merger announcement date.
Alam and Sickles (1998) analyzed the association between stock market returns
and relative technical efficiency in airline industry. The technical efficiency measured by
DEA served as the proxy for the firms’ managerial ability . Although they did not directly
study mergers and acquisitions in this industry, their results are, nevertheless, relevant in
the present context because they show that there exists both a statistically and an
                                                                                                                                                
4 Bidders and acquirers are used interchangeably in this paper.
7economically significant relationship between technical efficiency changes and market
returns. The correlation between technical efficiency and stock returns appears in the two
month after the disclosure of the financial data.
Huang (1999) and Kohers et al. (2000) investigated the stock market perception
of technical efficiency of the targets to bank merger announcements during the 1990s.
They adopted both DEA and Stochastic Frontier Approaches (SFA) to evaluate efficiency
of the acquired banks5. Then the efficiency levels of the targets and other control
variables are used to explain the bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on the date
of merger announcement. They concluded that the efficiency in general could explain
most of the abnormal returns of the stock price.
3. Methodology
3.1 Event Study Methodology
The ‘event study’ methodology, inspired by Fama et al. (1969) and Ball and
Brown (1968), utilizes stock market data to measure the impact of an event on the
participating firms over a certain period as the deviation of the stockholders’ actual rate
of return from its expected returns based on a particular value generating process. Those
“unusual” behavior of the stock returns lead to what is known as abnormal returns
)|( tititit XRERAR −=                                                                    (1)
where itAR , itR , and )|( tit XRE are, respectively, the abnormal, actual, and normal
returns for firm i  at time t . tX  is conditioning information for the normal return model
6.
                                                
5 For Stochastic Frontier Approach, refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
6 tX  includes all available information at time t other than the event.
8Hence abnormal returns provide information about the investors’ re-evaluation of the
stream of expected income from a stock given certain event.  The fundamental
assumption behind this approach is that capital markets are efficient with respect to
publicly available information such as a merger announcement7.
The first step in conducting an event study is to define the event of interest and to
identify the period over which the stock prices of the firms involved in this event will be
examined. This is called an event window. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, the
event date is the merger and acquisition announcement date. Conventionally, the event
date is set as 0=t , and a time period around the event date is used to aggregate abnormal
returns on the individual stock. The time line for an event study is shown in Figure 1
(MacKinlay, 1997:20). The time period between T0 and T1 is estimation window and T1
and T2 is the event window.
Typically, the estimation and the event windows do not overlap. The estimation window
provides estimators for the parameters of the normal return model, which are not
influenced by the returns around the event. The abnormal return is then calculated as the
difference between the actual returns and what is predicted by the fitted model using the
data from the event window (Mackinlay, 1997).
                                                
7 This is also known as the semi-strong form of the market efficiency hypothesis. See footnote 2 for
detailed explanation of the market efficiency hypothesis.
T0                                                    T1                          0                T2
Estimation window Event window
Figure 1. Time line for an event study
93.1.1 Estimation of Abnormal Returns
The commonly used normal return model is the market model (Fama, 1976:
chapter 3). It is based on the assumption that the joint distribution of all stock returns
)( ,...,2,1 nttt RRR in the market is the multivariate normal distribution. Stock return at time t
is defined as the ratio between the capital gain plus dividend and the initial price:
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where itd  is the dividend per share of the common stock of firm i  from the end of 1−t
to the end of t , itp  is the market price at the end of t  and 1, −tip  is the market price at the
end of 1−t . The market return
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is a linear combination of the individual stock returns that may be weighted either equally
or by their respective market shares to construct the market return. By the normality
assumption about the individual returns, the market return also has a univariate normal
distribution. Therefore, the joint distribution of itR  and mtR  is the bivariate normal, and
the expected return from a stock conditional on the market return is
mtiimtit RRRE βα +=)|(                                                   (4)
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RRCov=β , and )()( mtiiti RERE βα −= (5)
Furthermore, the conditional variance )|( mtit RRV has the same value for all values of
mtR . Therefore, the relationship between itR  and mtR  can be expressed as
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  (6)
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Besides, the deviations, itε , are normal with mean zero and variance independent of mtR ,
that is, 0)()|( == itmtit ERE εε  (7)
and )()1)(()|()|( 2 itimitmtitmtit VRVRRVRV ερε =−== (8)
where imρ  is the correlation coefficient between itR  and mtR  and
)()(
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mtit
mtit
im RVRV
RRCov=ρ . (9)
The properties of the bivariate normal distribution satisfy the classical assumptions of the
linear regression; therefore, OLS is generally used in the estimation of the parameters
ii βα ˆ,ˆ  in the market model based on the data in the estimation window. The abnormal
return is calculated using data in the event window as
)ˆˆ( mtiiitit RRAR βα +−= (10)
 where t  belongs to the event period.
A traditional event study usually aggregates abnormal returns cross-sectionally
through the relative time period to the event date. Given that firms in the sample are
independent and there is no overlap between the event dates, the average abnormal return
(AAR) and its variance are given by
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where N is the number of firms in the sample and 2ˆ iσ is the estimated variance for each
firm i. Also, for a specific choice of the event window (T1, T2), the cumulative abnormal
return and its variance are calculated as:
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where t belongs to the event window8. Usually the ‘t’ statistic utilized to test whether
average (or cumulative) abnormal return is significantly different from 0. It is well known
that validity of the t test rests on the normality assumption. In reality, the individual daily
stock returns may not be normally distributed. However, one may appeal to the Central
Limit Theorem to justify using the t test. Besides, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) also
conclude that when the cross sectional sample size exceeds fifty, the aggregated average
daily return is approximately normal (Brown and Warner, 1985).
3.1.2 Cross-sectional Model
The average abnormal returns capture the impact of a particular event on stock
returns in general on any day within the event window; similarly, cumulative abnormal
returns provide the overall effect over pre-specified event window. However, each
independent announcement has different market reaction. In order to single out the
sources of the abnormal return differentials, a cross-sectional model is usually employed.
The model is
imi uxxxFCAR += )...( ,2,1 (15)
where iCAR  is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i  over a pre-specified event
window, ix s refer to some firm-specific characteristics that contribute to the different
                                                
8 See Figure 1.
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market reaction and iu  is an added noise. The simplest model to capture the differences
of the abnormal returns is the linear functional relationship, that is,
immi uxxxCAR ++++= δδδδ ...22110 , (16)
where iCAR  is the cumulative abnormal return for i th observation, jδ s are the
coefficients, and 0)( =iuE . If the errors of equation (16) satisfy homoscedasticity and
cross-sectional independence, it can be easily estimated by OLS. But the standard
statistical tests of significance of the estimated coefficients presuppose a normal
distribution of the disturbance term. Homoscedasticity and normality are quite strong
assumptions in the context of stock market data. Therefore, in this study, we employ a
bootstrap procedure in order to perform significance tests without making these
assumptions.
3.2 Bootstrap
 Efron (1979) introduced the bootstrap procedure as a method of constructing
the sampling distribution of a statistic through resampling from the observed data. It
arises from an analogy in which the observed data assume the role of an underlying
population. In an ideal setting in which many samples can be drawn from the underlying
population F , one could compute the statistic from each sample and estimate its
variability across samples directly. However, it is usually not possible to draw repeated
samples from the population. So an optimal approximation of F  is the empirical
distribution nF  defined as:
nxxxF in /)(#)( ≤=                                                                                       (17)
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where )(# xxi ≤ is the number of times that the inequality holds as i  ranges from 1 to n.
That is, )(xFn  is the proportion of the sample observations that are less than or equal to x.
The bootstrap procedure is to resample with replacement from the empirical distribution,
and then apply the original estimator to each resampled data so that resulting estimates
mimic the sampling distribution of the original estimator. Suppose the observed data
),...,,( 21 nxxxX = constitute a random sample drawn from some unknown distribution
F and the statistic of interest ),...,,(ˆ 21 nxxxf=θ  is based on this sample. The empirical
distribution nF  yields the bootstrap samples ),...,,(
*
2
*
1
**
nxxxX = through random
sampling. From these we calculate bootstrap replications of the statistic of interest,
),...,,(ˆ *2*1** nxxxf=θ . Rather than having samples in which ix ~ F , we have bootstrap
samples in which ix* ~ nF . Then the distribution of 
*θˆ  around θˆ  in nF  is the same as of
θˆ  around θ  in F . That is:
)ˆˆ( * θθ − | nF ~ )ˆ( θθ − | F                                                                                  (18)
The big advantage of the bootstrap is that we can calculate as many replications of *θˆ as
we want, or at least as many as we can afford. This allows us to calculate the usual
statistical properties of the estimator, such as the mean, variance and confidence interval,
especially when it is not possible to analytically derive the sampling distribution of the
statistic *θˆ . The mean and standard error of the bootstrap estimator are:
∑
=
=
B
b
bb B
E
1
** ˆ1)ˆ( θθ                                              (19)
2*** )}ˆ(ˆ{
1
1)ˆ( bbb EB
se θθθ −−=                                                                    (20)
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where b  refers to the bth  bootstrap replicate ).,...,2,1( Bb =
Bootstrap estimators in general are biased. The bias of the bootstrap estimator is given by
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1993):
 θθθ ˆ)ˆ()ˆ( ** −= bb Ebias                                                                                    (21)
Based on the bootstrap bias, the bias-corrected estimator of θ  is:
)ˆ(ˆ2ˆˆ ** bbc Ebias θθθθ −=−=                                                                          (22)
Finally, we can use the percentile method to construct the )%21( α−  confidence interval
for the θ  based on the bias-corrected estimator bc*θˆ . There are alternative ways to
generate bootstrap samples. We describe below two of the most commonly applied
bootstrap methodologies are (i) the naive bootstrap and (ii) the smoothed bootstrap. For
reasons given below, we employ a different bootstrap procedure known as the wild
bootstrap for significance test of the regression coefficients in this study.
3.2.1 Naïve bootstrap Methodology
In a naïve bootstrap samples are drawn from original data through repeated
sampling with replacement. Suppose a sample of observed data ),...,,( 21 nxxxX =  is
drawn randomly from some population with an unknown probability distribution F . The
bootstrap sample ),...,,( **2
*
1
*
nxxxX = is an unordered collection of n elements drawn
randomly from the original sample X  of the same size with replacement. Because each
bootstrap sample consists of n observations that are drawn with replacement from the
data, each bootstrap sample typically omits several observations from the original sample
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and includes multiple replications of others. Therefore, a bootstrap sample will not
include any observation from the underlying population that was not drawn in the
original sample.  This is a major limitation of the naïve bootstrap procedure. One
consequence of this is that unlike smooth distributions, an empirical distribution of the
bootstrap sample has a “jump” at each observed value. The jumps reflect the fact that
only n distinct values are possible from this approximation to the true population F .
Although the bootstrap samples generally resemble the underlying distribution, they fail
to reflect the fact that the underlying distribution is continuous.
3.2.2 Smooth Bootstrap Methodology
One way to overcome the problem of the naïve bootstrap is to use kernel density
estimation to smooth the empirical distribution. A kernel-smoothed estimator is provided
by: )(1)(
1
∑
=
−=
n
i
i
n h
xt
K
nh
tF                                                                           (23)
where the h  is the smoothing parameter and is also known as the bandwidth in kernel
density estimation, K is typically the standard normal probability density function. By
convolution theorem (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), it is easy to show that
iii hxt ξ+=                                                                                                     (24)
where ix is the observed value in the sample and iξ is a random deviate drawn from the
standard normal distribution.
A smoothed bootstrap sample is generated from a given sample
),...,,( 21 nxxxX = by the following algorithm (Silverman, 1986):
(1) Generate a naïve bootstrap sample ),...,,( **2
*
1
*
nxxxX = from the original data.
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(2) Generate iξ  from the specified (standard normal density function) K .
(3) Set ii
s
i hxx ξ+= * , where h  is the smoothing parameter.
The smoothed bootstrap requires a choice of an appropriate bandwidth h .
Usually the optimal h  is obtained by minimizing the approximate mean integrated square
error. However, this h  itself depends on the unknown density function to be estimated. A
natural approach is to choose h  with reference to some standard family of density
functions, such as the normal densities. For the normal density and a Gaussian kernel, the
optimal h  is proportional to 5/1−n . Following Silverman (1986), a good approximation
can be obtained at
5/19.0 −= Anh                                                                                                   (25)
where A= min{standard deviation, interquartile range/1.34}.
3.2.3 Bootstrapping a Regression Model
In the regression model (16) outlined in section 3.1.2, the classical assumptions
about the random error are usually violated and the problems of non-normality,
heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation are endemic. Therefore, the test
statistics for the coefficients are generally not valid. A possible approach to address the
heteroscedasticity problem is to use the Heteroscedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimator (HCCME) (Eicker, 1963 and1967; White, 1980). It should be noted, however,
that the resulting variance estimates of the coefficients may be seriously biased
downward (Greene, 2000: 507)9. In that sense, the White estimator is overly optimistic
and the test statistic is likely to exceed the nominal level, especially in small samples.
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Moreover, GLS estimators depend crucially on the weight used and using the wrong set
of weights can also cause new problems.  Standard errors associated with the improperly
weighted least squares estimator will be incorrect. Even when the form of the
heteroskedasticity is known but involves unknown parameters, the additional variation
incorporated by the estimated variance parameters may offset the gains to GLS in small
or moderate sized samples (Greene, 2000:522-523).
On the other hand, bootstrap requires few distributional assumptions about the
disturbances in a regression model; hence the findings are less susceptible to violation of
the model assumptions. There are three ways to bootstrap regressions: bootstrap based on
residuals, paired bootstrap and external bootstrap or wild bootstrap (Shao and Tu, 1996:
291-292). The bootstrap (whether naïve or smoothed) applied to the sample of residuals
from a fitted regression model will not be robust against heteroscedasticity since it is
based on the i.i.d. assumption of the errors (Wu, 1986). By contrast, wild bootstrap and
paired bootstrap procedures are robust against heteroskedastictiy (Liu, 1988; Mammen,
1993; Shao and Tu, 1996: 292-295). Paired bootstrap usually assumes that the design
matrix X is random, and ),( XY  come from some joint distribution.  Understandably,
when the dimension of X gets large, it becomes unwieldy for empirical application.
Moreover, paired bootstrap does not impose the restrictions that 0)|( =xuE on the
bootstrap samples. Also, a bootstrap design matrix *X may not be of full rank even if the
actual X is. The wild bootstrap offers a better alternative because it ensures 0)|( =xuE
and has a better numerical performance than paired bootstrap (Horowitz, 1997).
The wild Bootstrap proceeds as follows.
                                                                                                                                                
9 For theoretical discussions, refer to Chesher and Jewitt (1987). For empirical simulation, see Jeong and
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(1) First one estimates the regression (16) model by OLS and obtains the unbiased
estimator jδˆ s along the regression residual
)ˆ...ˆˆˆ(ˆ 22110 mmii xxxCARu δδδδ +++−= (26)
where iuˆ  is the ith OLS residuals ( ni ,...2,1= ).
(2) For each i  let iF  be the two-point distribution that satisfies:
0)|( =iFzE (27)
22 ˆ)|( ii uFzE = (28)
33 ˆ)|( ii uFzE = (29)
where z  is a random variable with the CDF iF . In this distribution, iuz ˆ2
)51( −=  with
probability 
52
)51( + , and iuz ˆ2
)51( +=  with probability 
52
)51(1 +− 10.
(3) For each ni ,...2,1= , sample wiu  randomly from the distribution iF .
(4) Compute the wild bootstrap abnormal returns by adding resampled residual wiu onto
the least squares regression fit, holding the regressors fixed:
 iwmmi
w uxxxCAR ++++= δδδδ ˆ...ˆˆˆ 22110 (30)
(5) Obtain bootstrap estimates jwδˆ s from the model (16) using iwCAR  as the dependent
variable.
                                                                                                                                                
Maddala (1996), Horowitz (1997), and Cribari-neto and Zarkos (1999).
10 This is one possible construction of iF . For more alternatives see Mammen (1993).
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(6) Repeat step (3) to (5) for b =1,…, B, and use the resulting bootstrap estimates
j
B
jjj δδδδ ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 321  to estimate the bootstrap mean, variances, empirical percentile
interval and empirical p-value.
3.3 Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes in 1978 as a nonparametric method of measuring a firm’s technical efficiency11.
Unlike the parametric approach, DEA does not assume any functional forms of the
production, cost or profit function. In addition, it uses linear programming methods
instead of the least square regression approach. DEA constructs a production possibility
set from the observed input-output bundles of the firms in the sample with the following
assumptions12.
(A1) All actually observed input-output combinations are feasible.
(A2) The production possibility set is convex.
(A3) Inputs are freely disposable
(A4) Outputs are freely disposable.
Suppose that the input-output data are observed for n firms. Firm j produces the output
bundle y j using the input bundle xj. It is possible to empirically construct a production
possibility set satisfying assumptions (A1-A4) from the observed data set without any
explicit specification of a production function. Consider the input-output pair )ˆ,ˆ( yx
                                                
11 The nonparametric approach to measuring technical efficiency was introduced by Farrell (1957).
12 These are fairly weak assumptions and hold for all technologies represented by a quasi-concave and weakly
monotonic production function.
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where ∑= N jj xx
1
ˆ λ , ∑= N jj yy
1
ˆ λ ,∑ =N j
1
,1λ  and 0≥jλ  ( Nj ,...,2,1= ). By (A1-A2),
)ˆ,ˆ( yx is feasible. Now, by (A3), if ,xˆx ≥  then )ˆ,( yx is also feasibly. Next, by (A4), if
,yˆy ≤ then )ˆ,( yx  is feasible. Thus, using (A1-A4), we can construct the production
possibility set with variable returns to scale:
    ∑ ∑ ∑ =≥=≤≥= N N N jjjjjj NjyyxxyxT
1 1 1
)}....,2,1(0;1;;:),{( λλλλ 13 (31)
Using the above production possibilities set, we can measure the output-oriented
technical efficiency of firm s producing output Sy  from the input bundle Sx  as
S
OTE = *
1
ϕ (32)
where
*ϕ = maxϕ : ( Sx ,ϕ Sy )∈T. (33)
The DEA model for measuring output-oriented efficiency under the assumption of
variable returns to scale is14:
                               Max ϕ
                      S.T. S
1
y  ϕλ ≥∑
=
n
i
ii y                                  (34)
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13 This is known as BCC model due to Banker et al. (1984).
14 Similarly input-oriented technical efficiency can also be computed based on DEA. For information about
various DEA models, see any standard book on DEA book (e.g., Ray (2004)).
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Technical efficiency of each firm captures the firm’s managerial competence to produce
the maximum amount of output from a given available resources.
4. Empirical Evidences and Discussion
4.1 Data and Data Construction
Three datasets are employed in this research. The first is the roster of the
mergers and acquisitions obtained from Thomson Financial’s Worldwide Merges &
Acquisitions Database. The second dataset consists of the daily stock returns for both
bidders and targets and the corresponding market returns around the announcement date,
which are available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The
equal-weighted CRSP market return is used to capture the general market conditions. The
other dataset containing the firm level financial information from the relevant industries
for each merger, came from  Compustat. Each merger included in the sample satisfies the
following selection criteria: (1) both acquirers and targets are publicly traded companies,
which ensures that the financial information is available for those firms; (2) both
acquirers and targets are from the U.S. manufacturing industry (the two-digit SIC codes
between 20 and 38); (3) the deals are horizontal mergers, that is, the acquirer and target
have the same two-digit SIC code; (4) the sample period is from 1990 to 1999; (5) all the
deals are one hundred percent acquisitions; (6) the financial information of the firms
should be available for the year before the merger announcement date; (7) the stock price
information is available for the bidder and the target firm around the announcement date.
For firms with multiple merger announcement events, each event is treated as separate A
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firm with another merger announcement within six months of the announcement date is
eliminated. Eighty transactions met these criteria.
Three inputs, labor (L), capital (K) and materials (M), and one composite output
(Y) are used in the output-oriented DEA model. Input and output quantities are not
directly available from the Compustat but can be constructed indirectly from the financial
data. The labor input (L) is measured by the number of full-time employees (in
thousands). Following Christensen and Greene (1976) and Morrison (1999), the capital
(K) is treated as flow input and is measured by the sum of depreciation, amortization and
interest expenses deflated by the rental price of the capital. The rental price of capital is
defined as: )( drPk +× , where kP  is the price of the capital (measured by the producer
price index for capital good); r  refers to the real interest rate (measured by the average
interest rate on long-term corporate bonds deflated by the inflation rate obtained from the
producer price index); and d  is the depreciation rate (a ten percent rate of depreciation is
used for all the industries).
Total output is constructed by adjusting sales for changes in the inventories of
finished goods. Different deflators were used for opening inventories, sales, and closing
inventories.
The following procedure was followed to construct a quantity index for the raw
material input (M). The total expense on materials was approximated by the difference
between the total cost of good sold and total wages paid. Total wage payment is estimated
by multiplying the total number of employees by the average production labor cost can be
obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures for each industry. The raw material
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expenditure deflated by the producer price index15 of raw materials is used as a   quantity
index of the material input.
4.2 Event Study Analysis: Overall Results
We start off with the traditional event study outlined in section 3.1 in order to
get the abnormal return for each participating firm. The estimation window begins 126
trading days before for the bidding firms and 183 days for the target firms, and ends 16
days before the merger announcement16. Firm specific values of )ˆ,ˆ( ii βα  were estimated
from the data in estimation window using the market model in equation (6). The event
window covers fifteen days prior to and fifteen days following the merger announcement
date17. In order to assess the validity of OLS regression for the market model, different
tests were performed with the residuals from regression18. While the residuals do not
violate the linearity assumption, they do not conform well to the normality assumption.
Despite the violation of the normality assumption, however, the least squares estimators
remain unbiased and consistent. Overall, 80 percent of the acquiring firms do not exhibit
any autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity (either cross-sectional or temporal, i.e., auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH). For target firms, two thirds of the
regressions satisfy the OLS assumptions. Therefore, given the reasonably large sample
size19, OLS regression is not inappropriate for this dataset.
                                                
15 All price indexes used in this study were obtained from various tables published by Bureau of Labor
Statistic (BLS).
16 Travlos (1987) also use the estimation period 16 days prior to the announcement of the merger.
17 See figure 1 for the event study time line.
18 While the market model has its advantage of simplicity and robustness, it has been subjected to a lot of
criticism for not accounting for changes in the parameters during the event window, arbitrarily determining
the event period and violation the assumption of OLS regression.
19 Brown and Warner (1985) concluded that the average abnormal return is close to the normal distribution
if the sample size is greater than fifty.
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In order to avoid the problem of arbitrary choices of the event period, average
and cumulative abnormal returns were computed for event windows at different length.20
The AAR, CAR and ‘t’ statistics are calculated according to equation (11) and (13).
Table 1 reports the stock return at one-month interval around the merger announcement
date. For acquirers, the event date (t =0) abnormal return is significantly less than zero (t
ratio = 4.3), while for targets it is significantly greater than zero. This is not inconsistent
with the existing literature21.
4.3 Cross-sectional Analysis
The purpose of the cross-sectional analysis is to link the market reaction to
merger announcement with the technical efficiency of the participating firms. The models
examine if and in what manner is the stock market reaction toward a merger
announcement related to the technical efficiency levels of the firms involved in the
merger.  In order to measure the different impact on the acquiring and the target firms, the
following two cross-sectional regressions are specified:
            CRPMPhiPhitagCARi 43210 21_ ααααα ++++=
                                    iusizeLogsizeLog 165 )2()1( +++ αα  (35)
            CRPMPhiPhiacqCARi 43210 21_ βββββ ++++=
                                    iusizeLogsizeLog 265 )2()1( +++ ββ . (36)
                                                
20 The results are available from the authors on request. The plots of the average abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal return also show that the market uses the merger announcement information to make
a new assessment for shares of the participants.
21 See Jensen and Reback (1983) for a detailed review.
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Note that in this model, tagCARi _  and acqCARi _  are three-day cumulative abnormal
return (t = -1,0,1) for the target and acquiring firms respectively. Three-day cumulative
abnormal returns reflect the immediate impact of the merger announcements, and it also
creates a sufficient gap between estimation window and event window to clearly separate
these two. On the day before the merger announcement, there may be information
leakage due to market anticipation or other private gossip, while in some cases the
merger announcement is made at a late hour in the trading day, so that the market does
not have enough time to react the new information within the same day. Consequently,
the stock price on the day following the announcement may still contain valuable
information. Therefore, the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day abnormal
returns can provide better information than the one-day abnormal return.  Phi1 and Phi2
are the inverse of the output-oriented technical efficiency of the acquirers and targets,
respectively, obtained from the optimal solution of the model in (34) in section 3.3. They
represent the potential increase in output in the acquiring and the target firm,
respectively. Because the market evaluates a firm on the basis of its past performance,
Phi1 and Phi2 are computed from data pertaining to one year prior to the merger
announcement date. PM is a dummy variable for the method of payment. It assumes the
value unity if the transaction is financed by cash or mixture of cash and others, and zero
otherwise. It has been found that payment method in mergers and acquisition can affect
the market re-evaluations of the two participants and, generally, stock return favors the
cash offer (Bowers, et al., 2000; Travlos, 1987). CR represents the industry specific four-
firm concentration ratio prior to the merger and is included because it plays an important
part in the determination of the legality of the horizontal mergers (Eckbo, 1985). Log
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(size1) and Log (size2) are the logarithm of the size of the acquiring firm and target firm,
respectively. We use total assets of a firm to measure its size.
The summary statistics of the regression data are shown in table 2. The models
in (35) and (36) are both estimated by OLS regression and the fitted models reported in
Table 3. Before using the estimates and their standard errors for hypothesis testing, we
tested the residuals for normality and against heteroscedasticity. As can be seen from the
test statistics reported in Table 4, the normality assumption is strongly rejected in the case
of the regression for the acquiring firms by each of the tests employed. For the target
firms, the normality of residuals was rejected at 10 % or lower levels of significance by
all tests except the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. Further, the homoscedasticity assumption
was rejected by the White test at the 5% significance level for both regressions. In light
of these results, the usual ‘t’ tests of significance of the regression coefficients are of
questionable validity. The wild bootstrap procedure described in section 3.2.3 provides a
distribution-free test of significance of the individual regression coefficients. The
bootstrap regression estimates for acquirers and targets are listed in Tables 5 and 6,
respectively. The results of each regression using OLS are also shown in these two tables
for comparison. For the wild bootstrap, apart from the means we also report the various
quantiles of the empirical distribution of the coefficients. We conclude that a coefficient
is significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test of significance if the interval covering
the 2.5 percentile and the 97.5 percentile of the distribution does not include zero22. We
also report in the same table the p-values for the one-tailed tests of significance of the
coefficients. In the context of the bootstrap this p-value is measured by the proportion of
                                                
22 If the interval covering the 5% percentile and the 95% percentile of the distribution does not include
zero, we conclude that a coefficient is 10% significantly different from zero.
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the bootstrap replications in which the coefficient lies on the other side of zero23. Besides,
the empirical distributions of the coefficients from the bootstrap replications are also
shown in Figure 2.
While the OLS and the estimated coefficients from the OLS and the wild
bootstrap regressions are quite close to one another, differences in their sampling
distribution do lead to different conclusions from the tests of significance in a number of
cases. For example, in the regression for the acquiring firms, the coefficient of Phi2 is
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level in the OLS regression. But in the case of the
bootstrap regression, the coefficient is not significant even at the 10% level. In deed, it is
not found to be significantly negative even in a one-tailed test at the 10% level. This
leads us to the conclusion that the technical efficiency of the target firm is not a
significant determinant of the abnormal return for the stockholders of acquiring firms. In
the same equation, the size of the target firm (Size2) is found to be statistically
insignificant at the 10% level in the OLS regression.  By contrast, it is found to be
significantly different from 0 at the 10% level in a 2-tailed test and significantly positive
at the 5% level in a 1-tailed test in the bootstrap regression. In the regression for the
target firms, Phi2 is the only variable that is significantly different from 0 in the OLS
regression. In the bootstrap regression, apart from Phi2, Phi1 is significantly positive at
the 5% level and the payment method (PM) is also positive at 7.5% level in one-tailed
tests.
It may be noted that the coefficient of Phi1 is significantly positive in both
regressions. This implies that the abnormal return is higher for the bidder if the firm is
                                                
23 If the coefficient is positive, empirical p-value measures the percentage of the bootstrap replications that
are negative, and vice versa.
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less efficient before merger because the merger activity is interpreted as an effort to
improve efficiency and thereby to increase the future income flows. In the context of the
target, this sign is a little bit puzzling. One plausible explanation can be that target firms
might have a superior bargaining position towards a low efficient bidder, thus make the
target firms attractive in the market. The coefficient for Phi2 is not significant to the
acquirers, which implies that the investors of acquirers in general do not consider the
efficiency level of the target firms. However, the market reactions towards inefficient
targets from the point of view of the stockholders of the acquired firms are not the same
as the acquiring firms. As can be seen, the coefficient of Phi2 in regression for targets is
significantly positive. This reflects that the fact that the market is in favor of eliminating
an inefficient firm and its management. Therefore, market views the merger as beneficial
for the investors of the targets. As expected the coefficient for the payment method is
significantly positive in both regressions, which reflects that the market favors the
payment in cash. Such cash payment can be regarded either as a sign of the financial
strengthen of the acquiring firm, or as a signal of reducing the free extra cash holding of
the acquiring firms (Jensen, 1986). It can also be found that the coefficient of
concentration ratio is not significant in either of the regressions, which is consistent with
the findings of Eckbo (1985). It may imply that firms in manufacturing industry usually
do not consider monopolizing the market as the primary benefit through horizontal
mergers; instead they care more about the improvement of their fundamental
performance. On the other hand, an increase in the size of the target lowers the abnormal
return of the acquiring firm. When a large firm is acquired, it usually requires major
restructuring before the economic performance can be improved.
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The overall results can be summarized as follows:
- Lower efficiency of an acquirer has a positive impact on the abnormal returns of
both participating firms;
- Lower efficiency of the target has positive impact only on the value of the target
firm;
- The market favors cash payment for the acquisition;
- An increase in the size of the target has a negative impact on the acquirer’s
abnormal returns;
- Market concentration plays an insignificant role in horizontal mergers in
manufacturing industries.
5. Conclusions
Technical inefficiency, as measured by DEA, captures a firm’s shortfall from
the maximum output producible from a given mount of inputs. Abnormal returns of an
event reflect the investor’s re-evaluation of the future performance potential of the
participating firms. We find that there is a significant relationship between technical
efficiency and market response. The market apparently welcomes the merger as a
beneficial arrangement to better utilize the productive resources.
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Table 1: Stock Return at One-month Interval around the Event Date
Time AAR_bidders t-ratio CAR_bidders AAR_targets t-ratio CAR_targets
-15 -0.001651 -0.542145 -0.001651 0.003753 0.701198 0.003753
-14 0.000124 0.040637 -0.001528 0.000931 0.173869 0.004684
-13 0.001544 0.506798 0.000016 0.000914 0.170757 0.005598
-12 -0.004325 -1.419957 -0.004309 0.003027 0.565604 0.008625
-11 0.003444 1.130621 -0.000865 0.010458 1.953946 0.019084
-10 -0.002078 -0.682249 -0.002943 0.005556 1.038010 0.024640
-9 0.003670 1.204842 0.000727 0.007142 1.334369 0.031782
-8 0.003745 1.229507 0.004472 0.006064 1.132981 0.037846
-7 -0.003262 -1.070806 0.001210 0.004847 0.905605 0.042693
-6 0.005285 1.735183 0.006495 0.005521 1.031506 0.048214
-5 0.004985 1.636631 0.011480 0.012732 2.378632 0.060946
-4 0.004392 1.441908 0.015872 0.014076 2.629853 0.075022
-3 0.007498 2.461722 0.023370 0.015280 2.854675 0.090302
-2 -0.003975 -1.304950 0.019396 0.009049 1.690599 0.099351
-1 0.000082 0.026983 0.019478 0.011397 2.129248 0.110748
0 -0.013387 -4.395027 0.006091 0.193612 36.172209 0.304359
1 -0.000277 -0.091020 0.005814 0.060859 11.370120 0.365218
2 -0.003271 -1.073850 0.002543 0.004291 0.801626 0.369509
3 0.000116 0.038126 0.002659 -0.004100 -0.766063 0.365408
4 -0.000502 -0.164846 0.002157 0.002607 0.487027 0.368015
5 0.001047 0.343770 0.003204 -0.001698 -0.317302 0.366317
6 0.004219 1.385167 0.007423 0.005200 0.971435 0.371516
7 0.001113 0.365246 0.008536 -0.001970 -0.368091 0.369546
8 0.000233 0.076401 0.008768 0.000020 0.003662 0.369566
9 0.001108 0.363927 0.009877 0.001449 0.270651 0.371014
10 0.000410 0.134550 0.010287 -0.001055 -0.197077 0.369960
11 -0.000457 -0.150161 0.009829 0.002788 0.520934 0.372748
12 -0.000426 -0.139929 0.009403 0.000887 0.165809 0.373635
13 -0.002157 -0.708272 0.007246 -0.001928 -0.360215 0.371707
14 0.000447 0.146824 0.007693 -0.000480 -0.089619 0.371228
15 -0.004561 -1.497399 0.003132 0.002552 0.476694 0.373779
AAR: average abnormal returns
CAR: cumulative abnormal returns
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Regression Data
Description                                                                                   Mean     Standard error
Dependent variables:
  Cumulative abnormal return for acquirers (CAR_acq)           -0.01358         0.08056
  Cumulative abnormal return for targets (CAR_tag )               0.26587         0.24441
Explanatory variables:
  Technical inefficiency for acquirers (Phi1)                               1.3548            1.0131
  Technical inefficiency for target firms (Phi2)                           1.5892            0.9983
  Method of Payment (PM)                                                          0.425              0.4974
  Industry concentration ratio (CR)                                              0.5034            0.1188
  Logarithm of the size of the acquirers (Log(Size1))                  6.8456            1.7281
  Logarithm of the size of the targets (Log(Size2))                      4.5958            1.4560
Total number of the observations: 80
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Table 3: Cross Sectional OLS Regression for Bidders and Targets
      F statistic:  6.23*          R2: 0.3386        N=80       Dependent Variable: CAR_acq
      Parameters                   estimates                     standard error                t statistics
       Intercept                      -0.14282*                        0.05150                         -2.77
       Phi1                              0.04507*                        0.00833                           5.41
       Phi2                             -0.01733*                        0.00839                         -2.07
       PM                                0.03479*                        0.01600                          2.17
       CR                                0.07673                          0.06672                          1.15
       Log(Size1)                    0.01261*                        0.00536                          2.35
       Log(Size2)                  -0.00958                          0.00637                        -1.50
      F statistic:  1.80         R2: 0.1286         N =80          Dependent Variable: CAR_tag
      Parameters                   estimates                     standard error                t statistics
      Intercept                      -0.08395                         0.17935                         -0.47
       Phi1                              0.04041                        0.02901                          1.39
       Phi2                              0.05282**                    0.02922                          1.81
       PM                               0.07766                         0.05572                         1.39
       CR                              -0.08584                         0.23237                        -0.37
       Log(Size1)                   0.01605                         0.01865                          0.86
       Log(Size2)                   0.02425                         0.02218                         1.09
Notes: * represents 5% significance level for two-tailed ‘t’ test; ** represent 10%
significance level for two-tailed ‘t’ test.
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Table 4: Test Results for Normality and Heteroskedasticity
Residuals of the regression for the bidders:
 Test name                                                    Test statistics                            P value
Test for normality
  Shapiro-Wilk                                                0.963672            0.0226
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov                                  0.078313                                 0.1500
  Cramer-von Mises                                       0.115144                                 0.0730
  Anderson-Darling                                        0.806789                                 0.0371
  Bera-Jarque                                                  5.4294                                     0.0662
Test against heteroskedasticity
  White test                                                     41.4                                         0.0283
Residuals of the regression for the acquirers:
  Test name                                                  Test Statistics                           P value
Test for normality
  Shapiro-Wilk                                                0.9161              0.0001
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov                                  0.1045                                     0.0297
  Cramer-von Mises                                       0.1847                                     0.0083
  Anderson-Darling                                        1.2479                                     0.0050
  Bera-Jarque                                                  8.5356                                     0.0000
Test against heteroskedasticity
  White test                                                     50.62                                       0.0026
Notes:
Shapiro-Wilk test: a test for normality based on the linear combination of order statistics.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov: a goodness-of-fit test for normality based on the empirical distribution and it
measures the maximum vertical distance between empirical distribution and normal CDF.
Anderson-Darling: a goodness-of-fit test for normality based on the empirical distribution and it is based on
squared differences between empirical distribution and normal CDF using a different weights.
Cramer-von Mises: a goodness-of-fit test for normality based on the empirical distribution and it is based
on squared difference between empirical distribution and normal CDF with unitary weight.
Jarque-Bera: A test for normal distribution with unspecified mean and variance. The test statistic is based
on the estimates of the sample skewness and kurtosis.
White: White general test for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 5: Wild Bootstrap Estimation for Bidders
Parameters Estimate Standard errors Percentile Estimation
2.50% 5% 95% 97.50%
Intercept -0.1445* 0.0563 -0.2472 -0.2351 -0.0487 -0.0317
Phi1 0.0451* 0.0082 0.0284 0.0301 0.0553 0.0566
Phi2 -0.0170 0.0131 -0.0405 -0.0388 0.0061 0.0074
PM 0.0346* 0.0153 0.0033 0.0089 0.0590 0.0637
CR 0.0775 0.0636 -0.0466 -0.0266 0.1830 0.2006
Size1 0.0127* 0.0051 0.0022 0.0038 0.0208 0.0225
Size2 -0.0094** 0.0059 -0.0217 -0.0198 -0.0003 0.0013
         
OLS Estimation for Bidders
Parameters Estimate Standard errors 95% CI 90% CI
Intercept -0.1428* 0.0515 -0.2286 -0.0570 -0.2455 -0.0402
Phi1 0.0451* 0.0083 0.0312 0.0590 0.0285 0.0617
Phi2 -0.0173* 0.0084 -0.0313 -0.0034 -0.0340 -0.0006
PM 0.0348* 0.0160 0.0081 0.0614 0.0029 0.0667
CR 0.0767 0.0667 -0.0344 0.1879 -0.0562 0.2097
Size1 0.0126* 0.0053 0.0037 0.0215 0.0019 0.0233
Size2 -0.0096 0.0064 -0.0202 0.0010 -0.0223 0.0031
       
Wild Bootstrap for Bidders
Parameters Estimate Standard errors One-sided
  p-value
Intercept -0.1445* 0.0563 0.0065
Phi1 0.0451* 0.0082 0
Phi2 -0.0170 0.0131 0.169
PM 0.0346* 0.0153 0.0145
CR 0.0775*** 0.0636 0.1095
Size1 0.0127* 0.0051 0.0065
Size2 -0.0094* 0.0059 0.0455
    
Notes: * represents 5% two-tailed significance; ** represent 10% two-tailed significance;
*** represents 10% one-tailed significance.
One-sided P-value is calculated as: (# of positive or negative replications/ all the
bootstrap replications).
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Table 6: Wild Bootstrap Estimation for Target
Parameters Estimates Standard error Percentile estimation
2.50% 5% 95% 97.50%
Intercept -0.0899 0.1554 -0.4094 -0.3612 0.1657 0.2014
Phi1 0.0409* 0.0095 0.0217 0.0249 0.0563 0.0592
Phi2 0.0535** 0.0308 -0.0092 0.0004 0.1032 0.1109
PM 0.0794 0.0528 -0.0281 -0.0122 0.1633 0.1781
CR -0.0886 0.1993 -0.4488 -0.3923 0.2730 0.3362
Size1 0.0161 0.0215 -0.0248 -0.0173 0.0525 0.0581
Size2 0.0251 0.0255 -0.0279 -0.0179 0.0685 0.0758
         
OLS Estimation for Target
Parameters Estimates Standard error 90% CI 95% CI
Intercept -0.0840 0.1794 -0.3827 0.2148 -0.4414 0.2735
Phi1 0.0404 0.0290 -0.0079 0.0887 -0.0174 0.0982
Phi2 0.0528** 0.0292 0.0041 0.1015 -0.0054 0.1111
PM 0.0777 0.0557 -0.0152 0.1706 -0.0334 0.1887
CR -0.0858 0.2324 -0.4730 0.3013 -0.5490 0.3773
Size1 0.0161 0.0187 -0.0150 0.0471 -0.0211 0.0532
Size2 0.0243 0.0222 -0.0127 0.0612 -0.0200 0.0685
       
Wild Bootstrap for Target
Parameters Estimates Standard error One-sided
p-value
Intercept -0.0899 0.1554 0.2960
Phi1 0.0409* 0.0095 0.0000
Phi2 0.0535** 0.0308 0.0485
PM 0.0794*** 0.0528 0.0720
CR -0.0886 0.1993 0.3465
Size1 0.0161 0.0215 0.2495
Size2 0.0251 0.0255 0.1805
    
Notes: * represents 5% two-tailed significance; ** represent 10% two-tailed significance;
*** represents 10% one-tailed significance.
One-sided P-value is calculated as: (# of positive or negative replications/ all the
bootstrap replications).
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Figure 2. Boxplots of regression parameters using wild bootstrap method
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